Egypt Release of Anan & Reshuffle of Top Officers.. Causes and Implications
Introduction
Former Egyptian Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Sami Anan was released from detention almost two years after his arrest following his plans to compete with Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in the presidential election of March 2018. The military judiciary accused Anan of forging documents (his ID) stating that he had left the military without mentioning that he is still a ‘summoned’ reserve leader, breaching military discipline rules after announcing his intention to run for office against Sisi without obtaining a formal permission from the army, and incitement against military forces following releasing a video in which he presented his plans for the election. Samir Anan, son of Lt. General Anan, said that the Egyptian authorities released his father, without disclosing whether his release was a pardon or a medical release due to his health condition.
At the same time, Al-Sisi has recently ratified the most recent reshuffle of top military officers, where he started to re-assign some old guard officers, whom he had previously dismissed, in prominent senior positions within the military institution, most prominently Lt. General Osama Askar, who has become Chief of Military Operations – which we exclusively revealed a few days ago.
Some argue that the steps taken by Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi during the past few days indicate that Abdel Fattah al-Sisi after the popular protests that broke out on 20 September 2019, is completely different from Abdel Fattah al-Sisi before – from 3 July 2013 to 19 September 2019. Sisi, who used to ignore the advice of sovereign institutions, has now realized the danger threatening his regime and started to back down from his position in many files and started to reintegrate former leaders in the ruling system again, according to a new policy he has adopted to face this critical situation.
Does this indicate the beginning of a new phase in Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s rule, restoring some balance in power centers at the expense of Sisi, or it is just a reordering of priorities and objectives while Al-Sisi remains in control, holding all cards in his hand?
Al-Sisi before the September 20, 2019 protests
Al-Sisi has made many enemies within the military institution over the past eight years. He has fired nearly 50 military commanders from the military junta for domination of power, turning the governance system in Egypt, from the rule of the military institution as a whole – as established by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954 – to the rule of the military individual.
Indeed, Sisi has harassed anyone who tried to change his policies even those who sought change through running for presidential elections, such as Lt. General Sami Anan, Lt. General Ahmed Shafiq and Col. Ahmed Konsowa who attempted to run against Sisi and peacefully compete with him in the presidential elections that were held in the first quarter of 2018.
The abuse also reached those who tried from outside the military institution to support some military candidates against al-Sisi in the presidential election, such as Dr. Hazem Hosni, councilor Hisham Genena, and political activist Hazem Abdel Azim, who were arrested by authorities for backing Lt. General Anan in his presidential election campaign. Likewise, those who tried to follow the coup model as a means of change within the military institution after 3 July 2013 were also harassed, where hundreds of officers were tried on charges of trying to change the regime by means of a military coup.
Add to this the hostility that Sisi aroused in his struggle with the General Intelligence Service (GIS), which he has completely dominated since 2018, after dismissal of Maj. General Khaled Fawzi from the GIS leadership along with hundreds of GIS agents, and appointment of Maj. General Abbas Kamel as the GIS new chief and Mahmoud al-Sisi, General Sisi’s eldest son, as his assistant.
Since the early moments of the 3 July coup (2013), Sisi has worked to dominate the General Intelligence Service, which had enjoyed independence in management of several files away from the military institution. Some observers note that Sisi has realized the GIS strength, influence, and danger since he was appointed as director of the military intelligence in January 2010 during the Mubarak tenure. Therefore, when he assumed power in 2014, he started to dominate the GIS and bring it under his control to avoid any likely threats against his new regime.
According to some observers, there have been several change attempts that some individuals (groups) from within Egyptian sovereign institutions have sought since the 3 July coup (2013) for several reasons, most notably the turbulent political situation in the Egyptian State; the wrong policies pursued by the regime, where the armed forces alone have borne responsibility; the way in which the regime addresses the military situation in the Sinai Peninsula and the successive losses and casualties suffered by the army in these confrontations; the waiver of the Egyptian islands of Tiran and Sanafir; and ceding Egypt’s rights to Nile water and natural gas.
Observing the change attempts that some have tried to undertake from within Egyptian sovereign institutions have sought since the 3 July coup (2013), we find out that were multiple, repeated, and having several forms; while some adopted constitutional and legal means, through running for elections, others sought change through adoption of a violent approach.
The protests of September 20 came after cessation of protests against Sisi since November 2016, during the so-called “revolution of the poor”. However, this time Sisi had to respond to protests lest they be exploited by some figures within the military that oppose his policy to achieve their goals. Only after failure of mobilization for these protests, Sisi started to re-impose his control again after dismissal of 11 military commanders from the military junta.
The anti-Sisi party within the sovereign bodies in general have taken advantage of the September 20 protests to impose their demands and achieve their goals that they had long sought over the past years; and perhaps negotiation was an initial stage to achieve such goals.
The protests of 20 September 2019, were different from previous protests both in form and circumstances, where the party opposing Abdel Fattah El-Sisi acquired three new cards that had not available in that way before, namely:
1) Sisi’s crisis in international and regional relations, especially with the United States because of the Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jet deal with Moscow, which Sisi has worked to conclude with the Russian side despite the U.S. warnings, as well as Sisi’s strained relations with Saudi Arabia because of his abstention from actively participating in the military operations of the Arab coalition against Houthis in Yemen.
2) The revolutionizing factor and mobilization that the Egyptian contractor and actor Mohamed Ali, has called for, unlike previous calls made by the political Islam groups and movements or even the traditional opposition.
3) The death of President Mohamed Morsi put an end to the legitimacy scarecrow, which had been used by Sisi to silence any dissenting voice within the military and sovereign institutions.
The September 2019 protests gave the anti-Abdel Fattah al-Sisi party within sovereign bodies a new opportunity to practice pressures for achieving their goals in modifying the track of the governance system. According to some observers, the departure of the Sisi regime was not a major objective of the anti-Sisi party, for several reasons, most notably:
– Awareness of the strength of Sisi both internally and externally, which he has boosted over the past six years,
– Awareness that the current situation is unlike the situation of the Mubarak regime in 2011, and
– Fears about likely results of such change, which could completely damage the whole system and leave them no opportunity or room to return to the scene again.
One of the most important goals of the anti-Sisi party within the sovereign institutions is to restore the rules of governance to the pre-July 2013 state, where the military institution and the president used to be partners in government, not the rule of the military individual, a strategy that Sisi has sought to establish since he came to power. Therefore, the anti-Sisi party demand appointment of a vice-president from within the army to boost the military institution’s position in government. Also, the anti-Sisi party want to diminish the roles of certain officials around Sisi, including Maj. General Abbas Kamel, Brigadier Mahmoud Al-Sisi, Col. Ahmed Shaaban, and director of the GIS chief’s office, Maj. General Staff Mustafa Sherif, director of Sisi’s office, who aroused many hostilities because of his proximity to Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, and others; in addition to changing Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi’s policy on some issues, most importantly the issue of Tiran and Sanafir, the deal of the century, and others.
A new road map?
In my view, Sisi had two tracks to address the events of September 20 and confront the opposing party within the sovereign institutions which took advantage of the anti-Sisi September protests to achieve their goals, as follows:
1) To engage in negotiations with the party opposing him within the military and reach an agreement after responding to some of their demands.
This track, in my view, is the best option for the Abdel Fattah al-Sisi regime, although it requires changing some of Sisi’s policies, albeit partially. However, this is unfortunately the worst scenario for the Egyptian street, because Sisi will remain in power and enhance his position.
2) To remain intransigent and further target his opposing parties within sovereign institutions. This scenario could push Sisi’s military opponents to escalate confrontation, providing an opportunity to put an end to the rule of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi.
The steps that Sisi has recently taken, including the release of former Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Sami Anan, the return of some military leaders to the army ranks again, the sidelining of Mahmoud al-Sisi, son of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, albeit temporarily, and the removal of some military leaders known for being loyal to Sisi from their posts, indicates that Sisi has adopted the first track and engaged in negotiations with his opposing parties within the sovereign institutions.
Sisi is now redrawing his rule map in partnership with the former old guard officers in sovereign institutions that he had previously dismissed, as he has realized the danger threatening him along with his regime, and began to listen to the voices of dissidents within these institutions, reportedly in response to the advice of some of his allies, such as UAE’s Mohamed bin Zayed and the former Egyptian Minister of Defense, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi. Sisi is now attempting to redraw a new map for his regime so that it will allow him to last in power for many years to come.
Therefore, Sisi has recently taken several steps that may prove this hypothesis, including:
1- The Dec. reshuffle of senior officers
Although the reshuffle of senior military officers comes in the ordinary context, with respect to the timing (December), it included reassigning some old guard officers within the military institution, that had been dismissed by Sisi before, such as:
- General Osama Askar was appointed as the head of the Military Operations Authority instead of Major General Mohamed al-Masry, Sisi’s close friend. Askar was removed from his post as commander of the Unified Command in North Sinai in December 2016 after the events of the “revolution of the poor” in November 2016.
According to some reports, the Sisi regime was concerned lest these protests would be exploited by opposing parties within the military institution that disagree with the policies of Sisi, which are mainly based on changing the system of governance from the military institution to the military individual; besides their disagreement with Sisi in several other files, including waiver of the Egyptian islands of Tiran and Sanafir. According to some reports, Lt. General Osama Askar was among supporters of Lt. General Sami Anan presidential election bid in the first quarter of 2018.
- Prominent military commanders, known to be close to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, were excluded from their senior positions within the army, such as Maj. General Staff Mohamed Abdellah, who was removed from his post as Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense and SCAF Secretary while Maj. General Staff Emad Al-Ghazali was appointed in his place. Al-Ghazali, widely popular within the Egyptian army ranks, was in command of the Central Military Zone during the protests of 20 September 2019 and rejected the idea of deployment of the army forces in streets and squares, to face protesters.
- Dismissal of Maj. General Staff Abdel-Nasser Hassan Al-Azab, also known for his proximity to Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, from his post as head of the Officers Affairs Authority (OAA) and appointment of Maj. General Tarek Hassan as the new OAA chief. Hassan, known for being against Sisi’s policy in facing the armed insurgency in North Sinai, was dismissed from his post as commander of the Second Field Army in early 2019.
- Dismissal of Maj. General Staff Ayman Abdel Hamid Amer, one of the military leaders that are knowing for being close to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, from the position of Director of the Infantry Department, and appointment of Maj. General Staff Khaled Bayoumi in his place. This was interpreted by some observers as part of the decisions that Sisi has made to appease some opposing parties within the military.
- Appointment of Major General Ahmed Bahgat al-Demirdash as head of the armed forces’ Financial Affairs Authority (FAA) after dismissal of General Amin Nasr, known for proximity to Sisi. The chief of the Financial Affairs Authority is an extremely important and sensitive position within the military junta; therefore, Sisi was keen on appointing a close figure as head of the FAA, being the minister of economy of the military institution, and even the economy minister of the Egyptian State as a whole. Maj. General Amin Nasr who was dismissed from this sensitive position that he had occupied for almost five years during which he was advisor to Sisi for financial affairs, is known for being extremely close to Sisi; and since the appointment of Major General Amin Nasr, a figure close to Sisi. However, Maj. General Ahmed Bahgat al-Demirdash, who was appointed in Nasr’s place, is known within the army as a neutral personality, distancing himself from entering any conflicts.
2- Release of Sami Anan
The release of General Sami Anan, the former chief of staff of the Egyptian army, from detention after his arrest for almost two years in poor conditions, is considered one of the results of the understandings that took place between Sisi and the parties opposing him inside the military institution, because the arrest of Sami Anan was one of the most important issues that had greatly agitated the anti-Sisi party within the military.
3- Dismissal of Major General Mostafa al-Sharif
Sisi has recently appointed Maj. General Mustafa Shawkat, former commander of the thunderbolt forces, who enjoys wide-range acceptance within the Egyptian army, as commander of the Republican Guard instead of Major General Staff Ahmed Ali, who was appointed as head of the Presidential Court instead of Major General Mustafa Sherif, who had been unfavored within the army ranks because of his proximity to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. It is customary within the Egyptian army that the commander of the Republican Guard is appointed as chief of the presidential staff. Therefore, appointment of Maj. General Ahmed Ali as head of the presidential staff is not an innovation. For example, Zakaria Azmi had been one of the commanders of the Republican Guard before he was appointed as head of the presidential staff under former President Hosni Mubarak.
4- Restructuring the General Intelligence Service
During November 2019, Major General Nasser Fahmy, the deputy GIS director, took over the files that had been handled by Mahmoud Al-Sisi who was sidelined and reassigned to a long-term position at Egypt’s diplomatic delegation in Moscow, Russia, especially the file of the opposition moves in general and improvement of the image of the Egyptian regime overseas. Although Fahmi was deputy GIS director, i.e. the second man in the general intelligence service, however, he did not exercise his full powers on the ground, as most of his powers were in the hands Mahmoud al-Sisi. Anyway, Fahmy’s role is expected to become more prominent and active in the coming period. It is noteworthy that Fahmi is considered one of the intelligence officers who were close to former GIS director Maj. General Omar Suleiman, during the Mubarak era, where he served as head of the GIS administrative affairs and member of the National Council for Combating Terrorism.
On the other hand, some suggest that Mahmoud Al-Sisi was sent to the Russian Federation to receive professional training so that he can be well-prepared to handle important files in the general intelligence service because he failed to address the file of the media and opposition moves that he had been assigned before, in addition to his increased influence that had negatively affected the image of his father, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The proposal of sidelining Mahmoud Al-Sisi was reportedly an advice from UAE’s Mohamed bin Zayed and the former Egyptian Minister of Defense, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi. Other observers believe that sending Mahmoud al-Sisi to Russia was because Sisi considers relations with the Russian Federation one of the most important current files to secure Moscow’s support to his regime in the face of any threats in the event of a decline in relations with the United States, specifically after the departure of the Trump administration, in addition to coordination with Russia regarding the Libyan file and the support provided to retired general Khalifa Hafter, where Mahmoud al-Sisi is supposed to take over that important file at this specific timing.
According to circulated reports, Col. Ahmed Shaaban, director of GIS chief’s office, has recently been dismissed from his powerful position. Shaaban had been assigned by Major General Abbas, the current GIS chief, to manage the media file with the assistance of Mahmoud Al-Sisi. Shaaban was unfavored within various circles in the sovereign institutions because of his significant control over the media scene. However, Ahmed Shaaban has recently been sent to join the Egyptian diplomatic mission in Greece, like Mahmoud al-Sisi who was sent to Russia, according to reliable sources inside the GIS.
Some interpret the abuse that Yasser Selim, the businessman and former intelligence officer, has recently been exposed to came as a result of Sisi’s new policy within sovereign institutions. Yasser Selim has recently been arrested on charges of issuing checks without bank credit, based on judicial notices filed against him.
One of the most important indicators on starting to restructure the General Intelligence Service and bring the old guard officers to the façade again, is reassigning Maj. General Omar Nazmi to supervise the Libyan file again. Nazmi, who is considered one of the aides of former GIS director Maj. General Omar Suleiman, had been handling the Libyan file before it was withdrawn from him and transferred to Major Ehab Abdel-Azim, a friend of Mahmoud Al-Sisi. However, a few months ago, Maj. General Omar Nazmi took over the Libyan file completely one more time.
5- The return of Maj. Gen. Mohamed Raafat Al-Dash
Sisi has recently returned Maj. General Mohamed Raafat el Dosh to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) again after assigning him to command the forces of the east of the canal area, succeeding Maj. Gen. Yehya Taha El Hemeili. El Dosh had been the Third Field Army Commander before he was dismissed in 2017. Instead of taking command of the Unified Command and remaining as a military junta member, Sisi appointed him head of the Inspection Panel, a subsidiary body that does not enable its head to become a SCAF member.
Maj. General El Dosh had had strained relations with Sisi because of the wrong policy adopted by the Sisi regime in the fight against the armed insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula, and also because of his close relationship with Maj. General Osama Askar, who had also been excluded and harassed by Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi.
6- Likeliness of appointing a vice-president
One of the most important goals of the anti-Sisi party within the sovereign institutions is to restore the rules of governance to the pre-July 2013 state, where the military institution and the president used to be partners in government. One of their demands was to appoint a vice-president from within the military institution to restore the rules of government again and enable the military institution to be a real partner in government along with the president. In this regard, there are reports from within the military institution about likely appointment of Lt. General Ahmed Khaled, commander of the Egyptian navy, as vice-president.
According to some reports, the position of Lt. General Ahmed Khaled on the 20 September 2019 events was ambiguous, given that he did not attend the meeting that was held prior to Sisi’s travel to the United States on 19 September 2019, according to a picture during the funeral of Chief of Staff Ibrahim El-Orabi on 19 September, as leaders who attended the meeting went directly to attend the funeral immediately after the end of the meeting. The meeting was reportedly attended by Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, former Minister of Defense Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, and leaders of the main branches of the armed forces, to discuss developments in Egypt only one day before the 20 Sept. protests, in the presence of former Defense Minister Lt. General Sedki Sobhi and former Chief of Staff Lt. General Mahmoud Hegazy, who has recently been assigned to take over some important files again. This may also be an indicator of the new policy adopted by Sisi in relying on the old guard once again.
7- The recent cabinet reshuffle
The recent cabinet reshuffle witnessed the dismissal of Lt. General Younus al-Masry, the former commander of the Air Force from his post as Minister of Civil Aviation and appointment of pilot Mohamed Manar Enabah in his place. Al-Masry had been appointed commander of the Air Force in August 2012 by a decision from the late President Mohamed Morsi, and remained in that position until mid-2018, when Sisi appointed him as Minister of Civil Aviation to appease him. Some observers say this step is consistent with Sisi’s current policy after the recent understandings reached with the parties opposing him within the army and sovereign institutions, given that Al-Masry is known for being extremely close to Sisi and a strong supporter of his policies which aroused many hostilities among the army ranks over the past.
Some observers say that keeping Lt. General Kamel al-Wazir, who is significantly popular within the military ranks, in his position as Minister of Transport was against the desire of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Al-Wazir had been the head of the most important economic body within the Egyptian army, i.e. the Armed Forces Engineering Authority, and was dismissed from his position against his desire to be appointed as Minister of Transport in preparation to get rid of him completely according to Sisi’s policy of removing any leader that enjoys rising popularity within the army.
As for the retention of Major General Mohamed Said Al-Assar of his position as Minister of Military Production, after the recent cabinet reshuffle, it is, in my view a logical decision by Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi at that particular time, given the popularity that Al-Assar enjoys within the military institution from all sides, as one of the old guard officers. Al-Assar was appointed head of the Armament Authority in 2002, and he was a member of SCAF for nine years during the rule of former President Hosni Mubarak and in the era of Minister of Defense Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi; and served with the former chief of staff, Lt. General Sami Anan for six years, with whom he has strong relations. Sisi worked to remove al-Asar from the military a few months after he took over presidency, because of Al-Assar’s distinguished foreign relations, especially with the United States. However, Sisi appointed Major General Al-Assar as Minister of State for Military Production to appease him after dismissal from his military post as head of the Armaments Authority. According to the current policy adopted by Sisi of maintaining calm with opposing military parties in the military institution, it was difficult to remove General Al-Assar from his current position.
Semantics and interpretations
In my view, Sisi after 20 September 2019, is completely different from Sisi before that date, specifically during the period from July 3, 2013 to September 20, 2019. General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has realized the danger that is threatening him and is currently redrawing a new map for his regime. He started to listen to voices of dissidents within his sovereign institutions, whom he currently considers a real threat to him and to his regime. Therefore, Egypt’s General Sisi is now trying to redraw a new map for his regime so that he can remain in power for many years to come.
Sisi is currently adopting a new different policy to overcome the crisis he has faced since 20 September, whether the current crisis or the potential future threats from within the army and sovereign institutions, provided that such policy has nothing to do with the political opposition. Sisi learned the lesson after what had happened to Hosni Mubarak due to his intransigence and insistence on inheriting power to Gamal Mubarak, in disregard of the army’s disagreement, which eventually led to overthrowing him.
At the present time, Sisi seeks to ease the conflict between him and the military leaders opposing him, and appease them in one way or another, through dismissing some leaders known to be close and loyal to him and appointing others who are agreed on by both parties, being popular and neutral within the army ranks as well as other leaders that are counted on the party that opposes Sisi’s policy with the aim of calming the tense atmosphere.
Al-Sisi hopes, through his ‘new plan’, to consolidate his regime so that he can remain in power for many years to come without likeliness of facing unrest or major crises that might wreak havoc on the stability of the situation; and therefore, he is keen to end any differences within the sovereign institutions.
An important question remains about the anti-Sisi side within the army, with respect to the reasons behind pursuing influence: Do they target enabling a reformist stream within the military to amend the course of some important national issues and press for opening the political space or they only want to participate in power and governance and obtain part of the cake?
On the other hand, is Sisi’s current policy just a maneuver; and the deal concluded between Sisi and the parties opposing him within the military, will only bring a formal change to the regime of Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, keeping the old guard officers void of powers or the old guard military leaders have the necessary potential and capabilities to impose their agenda and acquire influence for amending some files?
In my view, the coming few months will provide answers to some urgent question such as:
– Is the recent reshuffle of top army officers a kind of soft coup against the desire of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi after the September 20 protests?
– Does Sisi still have the power to impose more control and domination on the scene?
– Has Sisi backed down from his position in some of his policies, on his own – not due to pressures from the opposing parties within the army and sovereign institutions – only to contain the crisis that has taken place following the September protests?
– The old guard officers had had differences with Sisi in many files, such as waiver of the Egyptian islands of Tiran and Sanafir, for example; will we witness a change in the Egyptian position on this issue?
– Will Lt. General Sami Anan return to practicing politics or he will remain under house arrest as part of his release deal, as had happened with Lt. General Ahmed Shafiq before?
– Will we witness some openness in the political space, as was planned on the agenda advocated by Lt. General Sami Anan in his election campaign?
– Will we witness a different policy in the face of the armed insurgency in North Sinai?
– Will the authorities release some of the detained army officers, such as Colonel Ahmed Konsowa and others, during the coming period, amid calls within the military to release them?
– What about the other prominent figures who had supported Anan in his presidential bid and were later arrested, such as councilor Hisham Genena, Dr. Hazem Hosni and others?
The answer to these questions and others will determine the fate of the recent changes in management of the country’s affairs. In my view, the coming few months will provide answers to all these questions.
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Appendix 1
December 2019 military reshuffle
1-Dismissal of Major General Staff Mohamed Al-Masry from his post as commander of the Operations Authority and the appointment of General Osama Askar in his place.
2-Appointment of Major General Staff Khaled Bayoumi as director of the Infantry Department succeeding Major General Ayman Abdel Hamid Amer.
3-Dismissal of Major General Mohamed Abdallah from his post as head of the Armed Forces Logistics Authority and the appointment of Major General Walid Abul Magd to replace him.
4-Dismissal of Major General Staff Abdel-Nasser Hassan Al-Azab from his post as head of the Officers Affairs Authority and appointment of Major General Tareq Hassan in his place as the new OAA chief.
5-Appointment of Major General Khaled Tawfik as head of the Military Research Authority and appointment of Major General Walid Hammouda as commander of the Popular Defense Forces.
6-Dismissal of Major General Mohamed Abdellah from the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Defense and the appointment of Major General Staff Emad Al-Ghazali to succeed him.
7-Dismissal of Major General Khaled Ahmed Shawky from the command of the Northern Military Zone and appointment of Major General Staff Fahmy Haikal to replace him.
8-Appointment of Major General Medhat El-Essawy as Chief of Staff of the Northern Military Zone.
9-Dismissal of Major General Naeem Thabet from the command of Southern Military Zone and appointment of Major General Ashraf Al Hosari to replace him.
10-Appointment of Major General Staff Ali Osman as Chief of Staff of the Southern Military Zone.
11-Appointment of Major General Ahmed Safi as commander of the 18th Infantry Division at the Central Military Zone.
12-Appointment of Major General Staff Ahmad Bahgat Al-Demirdash as head of the Financial Affairs Authority.
13-Appointment of Major General Mohammed Issa Al-Nadi as director of the Military Assignments Department.
14-Appointment of Major General Ashraf Selim as director of the armed forces medical services.
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